Most other specifications regarding § 523(a)(8) recognize not all the monies agreed to a student that at some point pay money for a knowledge is “educational fund
26. ” For example, § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) excepts loans by non-profits and the government only when they are made for an “educational benefit.” Similarly, § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) emphasizes that only those obligations to repay educational benefits, scholarships, or stipends are nondischargeable. Wonderful, 596 B.R. at 269-270. Courts interpreting § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) contemplate the difference between a standard consumer loan, traditional student loans, and other monies that bestow an educational benefit. Homaidan v. SLM Corp. (Into the re Homaidan), 596 B.R. 86, 102 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), “both by its terms and read in context, does not sweep in all education-related debt, or all loans that support a student’s efforts to gain the benefits of an education”); Golden, 596 B.R. at 265 (“[Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)] does not include all debt that confers the benefits of an education on the borrower.”). ‘ ” Golden, 596 B.R. at 268.
Concurrently, the Dental Loan and you can Promissory Note made zero mention of Debtor’s scholar standing or even the proven fact that it dealt with funds used for the a training
27. Homaidan warns against extending nondischargeability to loans that lack these traditional characteristics. Homaidan, 596 B.R. at 102 (“It is hard to see where [this argument] would end-conceivably, it would encompass credit card debt that was incurred to purchase textbooks, personal loans that were used to pay for tuition and school fees, and any other debt that, in one way or another, facilitated a student’s efforts to gain the ‘benefits’ of an education.”). Homaidan says “that is not what Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) encompasses, or what the Bankruptcy Code permits, or what Congress intended.” Id.
28. The Oral Loan lacks all of the traditional characteristics of a student loan and is more like the credit card debt and personal loans that Homaidan concludes are dischargeable under § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). It had an incredibly low interest rate and the extension of credit came after the Debtor completed her education or had a need for student financing. The court heeds the cautionary language found in Homaidan. Based on the statutory language as interpreted by the relevant case law, the Oral Loan was not an educational loan within the meaning of § 523(a)(8)(B).
29. “Another factor which augurs in favor of a finding that the subject debt is not exempt from discharge” is the legislative history, London- WL 2705374, at payday loans Fairfield WA *6, and the public policy initiatives that create the backdrop to § 523(a)(8). “The Bankruptcy Code was drafted to provide a discharge procedure that enables insolvent debtor’s [sic] to reorder their affairs and start a new life without the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Posner, 434 B.R. at 803 (citation omitted). One goal of the discharge provisions is to protect “the honest but unfortunate debtor’s right to a fresh start.” Lamento v. U.S. Dep’t out-of Educ. (Within the re also Lamento), 520 B.R. 667, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2014) (citing Posner, 434 B.R. at 803). Nonetheless, Congress chose to “exclude certain obligations from the general policy of discharge where the public policy at issue outweighs [a] debtor’s need for a fresh start.” Posner, 434 B.R. at 803 (citing Into the re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993)). “[I]n the case of section 523(a)(8), Congress has revealed an intent to limit the dischargeability of educational loan debt, and [a court] can construe the provision no more narrowly than the language and legislative history allow.” When you look at the re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 745 (3d Cir. 1993). As such, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) limits the “ability of students to discharge educational loans to protect the financial integrity of educational loan programs.” Posner, 434 B.R. at 803 (citing Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743).
